Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2008 16:44:04 -0400 Subject: [Fcalerts-list] Supreme Court Victory -ish. We won! Mostly. The Supreme Court concluded today that the Second Amendment does indeed protect an individual right to arms and that the DC handgun ban and requirement that all guns be rendered inoperable within the home, were violations of that protection and must be changed. Specifically, the Court ordered that the District of Columbia must allow Richard Heller to register a handgun and be issued a permit to carry it about within the confines of his home in a functional condition for purposes of self-defense. The Court did not delve deeply into what restrictions would or would not be acceptable under the Second Amendment though their order that Heller be allowed to register a handgun and be issued a permit clearly suggest that they consider such registration and permitting acceptable limitations. In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia also stated that prohibiting felons and mental incompetents from firearms was clearly constitutional and repeated the thoroughly specious argument that he expressed during aural arguments to the effect that weapons which are not, “in common use,” are not included within the Second Amendment’s guarantees. He specifically gave the example of M-16 rifles being common to military use, but uncommon to civilian possession – completely ignoring the fact that the only reason M-16’s are not commonly possessed is that their sale to private citizens was extremely complicated and cost prohibitive for the first twenty years of that arm’s existence and has been completely banned for the past twenty two years. No doubt Scalia and his co-signers included this information – which has absolutely no bearing on the case at hand – to assuage the fears of the Solicitor General and others who have suggested that an “individual right” decision would open a floodgate of assaults on existing federal laws restricting machineguns and “destructive devices.” Regardless of the motive for the position, it is as totally nonsensical as the ridiculous suggestions put forward in the two minority opinions. The length to which the dissenting Justices are willing to twist history and contort language in attempts to justify their outrageous positions is nothing less than staggering. The intellectual gymnastics engaged in by the Justices in their efforts to support their idiotic, fore drawn conclusions should seriously shake the faith of the most trusting citizen. It is simply outrageous that men and women of intellect and learning would take up a position and then selectively sort through history for tiny threads of support for that position while completely ignoring the full, rich tapestry which displays a clear picture of an absolutely opposite position. The intellectual dishonesty displayed by the dissenting Justices – and to a much lesser degree by the majority – should be deeply disturbing to every thinking American. These are not trivial matters that are being dealt with by the Court. These are issues that reach down to the basic founding principles of our republic. How can we entrust matters of such great import to people who demonstrate a willingness to contort history to their own personal beliefs and philosophies rather than examining evidence and drawing rational conclusions based on that evidence. Today’s decision by the Supreme Court makes two things abundantly clear: * Defenders of liberty and our Constitutional Republic face a long and tedious battle to secure and defend our rights. * It is absolutely critical that the next President, and every President thereafter, is committed to appointing judges and justices who will interpret law and the Constitution based on history and facts, not their own agendas. The courts have the potential to undermine and ultimately destroy our nation and our way of life. It is incumbent upon all of us to diligently work against the erosion that is eating away at the very foundations of our society. Below is the official syllabus (summary) from the Court “Reporter of Decisions.” It pretty well sums up the majority opinion. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ET AL. v. HELLER CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. 07–290. Argued March 18, 2008—Decided June 26, 2008 District of Columbia law bans handgun possession by making it a crime to carry an unregistered firearm and prohibiting the registration of handguns; provides separately that no person may carry an unlicensed handgun, but authorizes the police chief to issue 1-year licenses; and requires residents to keep lawfully owned firearms unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device. Respondent Heller, a D. C. special policeman, applied to register a handgun he wished to keep at home, but the District refused. He filed this suit seeking, on Second Amendment grounds, to enjoin the city from enforcing the bar on handgun registration, the licensing requirement insofar as it prohibits carrying an unlicensed firearm in the home, and the trigger-lock requirement insofar as it prohibits the use of functional firearms in the home. The District Court dismissed the suit, but the D. C. Circuit reversed, holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess firearms and that the city’s total ban on handguns, as well as its requirement that firearms in the home be kept nonfunctional even when necessary for self-defense, violated that right. Held: 1. The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. Pp. 2–53. (a) The Amendment’s prefatory clause announces a purpose, but does not limit or expand the scope of the second part, the operative clause. The operative clause’s text and history demonstrate that it connotes an individual right to keep and bear arms. Pp. 2–22. (b) The prefatory clause comports with the Court’s interpretation of the operative clause. The “militia” comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. The Antifederalists feared that the Federal Government would disarm the people in order to disable this citizens’ militia, enabling a politicized standing army or a select militia to rule. The response was to deny Congress power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and bear arms, so that the ideal of a citizens’ militia would be preserved. Pp. 22–28. (c) The Court’s interpretation is confirmed by analogous armsbearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and immediately followed the Second Amendment. Pp. 28–30. (d) The Second Amendment’s drafting history, while of dubious interpretive worth, reveals three state Second Amendment proposals that unequivocally referred to an individual right to bear arms. Pp. 30–32. (e) Interpretation of the Second Amendment by scholars, courts and legislators, from immediately after its ratification through the late 19th century also supports the Court’s conclusion. Pp. 32–47. (f) None of the Court’s precedents forecloses the Court’s interpretation. Neither United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 553, nor Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 264–265, refutes the individualrights interpretation. United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, does not limit the right to keep and bear arms to militia purposes, but rather limits the type of weapon to which the right applies to those used by the militia, i.e., those in common use for lawful purposes. Pp. 47–54. 2. Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited. It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose: For example, concealed weapons prohibitions have been upheld under the Amendment or state analogues. The Court’s opinion should not be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. Miller’s holding that the sorts of weapons protected are those “in common use at the time” finds support in the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons. Pp. 54–56. 3. The handgun ban and the trigger-lock requirement (as applied to self-defense) violate the Second Amendment. The District’s total ban on handgun possession in the home amounts to a prohibition on an entire class of “arms” that Americans overwhelmingly choose for the lawful purpose of self-defense. Under any of the standards of scrutiny the Court has applied to enumerated constitutional rights, this prohibition—in the place where the importance of the lawful defense of self, family, and property is most acute—would fail constitutional muster. Similarly, the requirement that any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock makes it impossible for citizens to use arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutional. Because Heller conceded at oral argument that the D. C. licensing law is permissible if it is not enforced arbitrarily and capriciously, the Court assumes that a license will satisfy his prayer for relief and does not address the licensing requirement. Assuming he is not disqualified from exercising Second Amendment rights, the District must permit Heller to register his handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home. Pp. 56–64. 478 F. 3d 370, affirmed. SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. _______________________________________________